On a dark navy blue matte background, gold foil Arabic calligraphy 'Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye' above a modern abstract geometric scale symbol representing global trade.

Majalla Articles 36–45: Theory of Custom, Usage, and Commercial Practice in International Arbitration Applications

by with No Comment Mecelle Series

Introduction

Codified between 1868 and 1876 by a commission headed by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, the Majalla (Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye) remains one of the most concrete, dynamic, and systematic codifications of the Islamic law of obligations and commerce. Among the qawa’id al-fiqhiyya (general principles of jurisprudence) that constitute the first 100 articles of the Majalla, Articles 36 to 45 establish the “Theory of Custom, Usage, and Commercial Practice,” serving as the bridge between black-letter law and the realities of social and commercial life.

In modern global trade, drafting a flawless and perfectly exhaustive contract is virtually impossible. When it comes to filling contractual gaps, interpreting commercial terms, and integrating new needs arising from technological advancements into the legal framework, Articles 36–45 of the Majalla demonstrate a flawless alignment with modern international trade law (Lex Mercatoria) and the practices of international arbitration.

I. Majalla Articles 36–45: Texts, Commentaries, and International Arbitration Precedents

Article 36: Custom as an Arbitrator

Text: “Custom is recognized as a binding authority (arbitrator).”

(Âdet muhakkemdir.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: The term “muhakkem” (recognized as an arbitrator/binding authority) indicates that in matters where no explicit statutory or religious textual injunction (nass) exists, custom and usage are accepted as binding legal evidence and the primary point of reference. In his commentary, Ali Haydar Efendi notes that this rule stems from the Hadith: “That which Muslims deem to be good is good in the eyes of God.” Custom emerges when an act ceases to be coincidental and takes root in the mind of the society or sector through repetition.
  • Application in International Trade: In international arbitration or sales contracts, when an issue is not explicitly regulated by the parties, the established usages of the relevant sector are directly accepted as the “arbitrator” to resolve the dispute.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 8817 (1997): In a dispute arising from an international sales contract, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that even in the absence of an explicit contractual provision, pursuant to the principles of Lex Mercatoria and CISG Article 9(2), commercial usages widely known and regularly observed in international trade act directly as the “arbitrator” to supplement the contract.

Article 37: Custom as Conclusive Proof

Text: “The usage of people is a conclusive proof that must be acted upon.”

(Nâsın istimâli bir hüccettir ki onunla amel vâcip olur.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: For an act to yield legal consequences, it must not be a mere personal habit but a widespread practice (istimâl) among people (nâs) or merchants. This practice serves as a binding and conclusive proof (hüccet) before the courts, establishing the intent of the parties and the scope of the obligation.
  • Application in International Trade: In international freight or letter of credit (L/C) transactions where rigid written procedures might not always be followed, the generally accepted practices of the banking and logistics sectors serve as conclusive proof of whether an obligation was properly performed or breached.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 3820 (1980): The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that the UCP (Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits) published by the ICC constitutes a binding proof (hüccet) and commercial usage in the execution of L/C transactions due to its widespread sectoral use (istimâl), even if the parties did not explicitly incorporate it into their text.

Article 38: The Limit of Custom – Widespread Application

Text: “A custom is only recognized if it is continuous or widespread.”

(Âdet ancak mütred yahud şâyi oldukta mu’teber olur.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: Not every behavior qualifies as a custom. For a practice to be legally recognized, it must meet one of two conditions: It must be muttarıd (continuous, regular, and consistent) or şâyi (widespread and known by the majority of the society or merchants in that sector). Isolated, personal, or coincidental practices do not attain the force of custom.
  • Application in International Trade: A party is precluded from imposing a narrow habit specific to its internal operations or local market onto its international partner as a “sectoral usage.” The usage must be demonstrably “widespread and continuous” on an international scale.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • CIETAC (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission) Award, 2006 (CISG/2006/16): The Arbitral Tribunal found that a commercial habit asserted by one party was confined to a local level and was not applied in a “regular and widespread” (muttarıd/şâyi) manner in the international market; therefore, it could not be recognized as a binding international trade usage.

Article 39: Adaptation of Rulings to Changing Times

Text: “It cannot be denied that with a change of times, the requirements of the law change.”

(Ezmanın tebeddülü ile ahkâmın tebeddülü inkâr olunamaz.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: This principle demonstrates the dynamic, rather than static, nature of the law. While fundamental statutory/religious principles remain unchanged, rulings based on custom, changing circumstances, and public interest (maslahah) evolve as times change. Rooted in Imam Abu Yusuf’s jurisprudential methodology, this rule allows ancient precedents and practices to be adapted to meet new socio-economic needs.
  • Application in International Trade: In the face of new instruments emerging from technological advancements or shifting financial balances due to economic crises, contracts are permitted to be stretched or adapted to changing circumstances (Hardship).
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 4761 (1987): The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that in the face of radical changes in international economic conditions and commercial customs over the years, the provisions of the contract could be adapted in accordance with the new realities of the time and the market (consistent with the UNIDROIT Principles of Hardship) if the contractual equilibrium is fundamentally altered.

Article 40: Superiority of Customary Meaning over Literal Meaning

Text: “The customary meaning of words is preferred over their literal meaning.”

(Hakîkatın terkine bedel olan ma’nâ-yı örfî mu’teberdir.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: When a term used in a contract has both a “literal/dictionary meaning” (hakikat) and a “customary/sectoral meaning” (mânâ-yı örfî), the customary meaning prevails. In Ali Haydar Efendi’s example, if a person swears, “I will not set foot in his house,” the customary intent is “not to enter the house,” and merely placing a bare foot inside the doorway does not break the oath.
  • Application in International Trade: Terms used in commercial contracts are interpreted not according to their general English dictionary definitions, but according to the technical meaning understood by professionals in that specific industry or trade sector.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 8385 (1995): When the general dictionary definition of a technical delivery term used in a contract conflicted with its specific commercial meaning in the relevant sector, the arbitrators rejected the literal dictionary meaning and based their decision on the technical/customary meaning (mânâ-yı örfî) attributed to the term by the merchants in that industry.

Articles 41 and 42: Boundaries and Impediments of Custom

Article 41 Text: “When an impediment and a requirement concur, the impediment is preferred.”

(Mânî’ müctemi’ oldukta muktezâya tercih olunur.)

Article 42 Text: “For a custom to be recognized, it must not contradict an explicit textual injunction (nass).”

(Âdetin mu’teber olması nass-ı şâri’e muhâlif olmamakla meşrûttur.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: These two articles draw the boundaries of legitimacy for custom. No matter how widespread a custom or usage may be, it is invalid (void custom) if it contradicts public policy, morality, or an explicit, mandatory statutory/religious provision (nass).
  • Application in International Trade: The fact that bribery or tax evasion has become a custom in a particular sector or region does not grant it legal validity. International public policy and mandatory rules (Jus Cogens) supersede any custom.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 1110 (1963 – Judge Gunnar Lagergren): The assertion that paying bribes to intermediaries to influence public officials was a widespread custom/tradition in the commercial life of a specific country was categorically rejected. The arbitrator ruled that no custom or practice contrary to international public policy and mandatory moral rules could be legally protected, and that bribery contracts based on such illicit customs are void ab initio.

Article 43: Implied Terms – That Which is Recognized

Text: “That which is recognized by custom is regarded as a stipulated condition.”

(Maruf olan şey, şart kılınmış gibidir.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: Rules of good faith and performance that are widely known (maruf) in the market are considered inherent parts of the contract (implied terms), even if the parties did not explicitly state them when forming the agreement. The defense of “it was not explicitly written” is rendered invalid.
  • Application in International Trade: Even if not explicitly stated in the contract, a seller is obligated to provide standard packaging or prepare the goods suitably for transport, as dictated by international standards.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 5713 (1989): The Arbitral Tribunal held that, despite the absence of an explicit contractual provision, packaging goods in a manner suitable for maritime transport in international sales is an implied condition widely known and accepted (maruf) in the trade, and the breach of this condition constitutes a breach of contract (paralleling CISG Art. 35(2)(d)).

Article 44: Usages Among Merchants as Implied Conditions

Text: “That which is recognized amongst merchants is regarded as a stipulated condition between them.”

(Tüccar beyninde maruf olan şey, aralarında meşrût gibidir.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: This is the specific application of Article 43 to commercial life. Beyond general societal custom, the specific jargon, payment terms, and quality tolerance margins established by merchants within their specific commercial sectors are as binding as written contractual provisions.
  • Application in International Trade: In the trade of grain, minerals, or commodities, margins of tolerance or quantity deviations during delivery, even if not specified in the contract, do not require compensation provided they fall within acceptable limits according to exchange and merchant usages.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 8908 (1998): In a dispute concerning quantity tolerance margins among merchants engaged in pipeline and commodity trading, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that the established rules and usages among the merchants (tüccar beyninde maruf olan) constitute binding contractual provisions that must be applied between the parties, even if not explicitly written in the text.

Article 45: Equivalence of Customary and Statutory Determination

Text: “A matter established by custom is like a matter established by law.”

(Örfî olan bir tâyin, nassî olan bir tayin gibidir.)

  • Commentary and Analysis: This serves as the binding concluding article of the 36–45 sequence. A right or obligation defined by custom and usage yields legal consequences as if it were determined by the statute itself. It provides the judge or arbitrator with a complete legal basis in disputes between parties.
  • Application in International Trade: If the “FOB” or “CIF” rule is selected in an international sale, even if the law does not dictate where obligations and risks transfer, it is determined pursuant to Incoterms custom, and this determination binds the tribunal exactly like a statutory provision.
  • Arbitral Precedent:
    • ICC Arbitral Award, No. 8548 (1996): In a case where “FOB” was used as the delivery term in an international sales contract, it was ruled that the point at which risk and costs transfer between the buyer and seller would be determined by Incoterms rules; this determination made by commercial custom yields binding legal consequences identical to an explicit, mandatory statutory provision.

II. Comparison Table

The parallels between the Majalla’s theory of custom and usage and modern legal systems, as well as international arbitration mechanisms, can be summarized as follows:

Majalla ArticleFundamental Legal PrincipleModern International Law (CISG / UNIDROIT / ICC)Arbitral Precedent / Jurisprudence
Art. 36 & 37Custom as Arbitrator and Conclusive ProofCISG Art. 9(2) & UCP 600ICC Award No. 8817 & No. 3820
Art. 38Requirement of Continuous and Widespread UsageUNIDROIT Art. 1.9(2)CIETAC Award (CISG/2006/16)
Art. 39Adaptation of Rules to Changing TimesUNIDROIT Hardship / AdaptationICC Award No. 4761
Art. 40Superiority of Customary Meaning over Literal MeaningUNIDROIT Art. 4.3 (Sectoral Interpretation)ICC Award No. 8385
Art. 41 & 42Superiority of Public Policy and Mandatory RulesInternational Public PolicyICC Award No. 1110 (Lagergren)
Art. 43 & 44Recognized Practices as Implied TermsCommon Law Implied Terms & IncotermsICC Award No. 5713 & No. 8908
Art. 45Equivalence of Customary and Statutory DeterminationLex Mercatoria PrinciplesICC Award No. 8548

III. Conclusion

The Theory of Custom, Usage, and Commercial Practice constructed between Articles 36 and 45 of the Majalla proves that the Islamic law of obligations is far from a rigid and dogmatic structure; conversely, it is a system that provides highly flexible and realistic responses to the needs of commercial life.

As evidenced by the precedents of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the logical sequence (Lex Mercatoria) relied upon by arbitral tribunals resolving disputes in global trade aligns flawlessly with this 10-article regulatory set codified by the Majalla in the 19th century.

On a dark navy blue matte background, gold foil Arabic calligraphy 'Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye' above a modern abstract geometric scale symbol representing global trade.

Causation in Tort Law: The Mecelle (Articles 90-93), Comparative Law, and International Trade

by with No Comment Mecelle Series

The Mecelle (Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye) is the first civil code of the Ottoman Empire, drafted between 1868 and 1876 by a commission headed by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. It codified the rules of Islamic law (specifically Hanafi jurisprudence) concerning obligations, property, and trial procedure using a modern codification technique. Comprising 1,851 articles—the first 100 of which are dedicated to the general principles of Islamic jurisprudence (qawa’id al-fiqhiyya)—the Mecelle provides a magnificent logical framework that guides the theories of causation, liability, and fault, remaining a cornerstone not only for its era but also for contemporary comparative tort and obligations law.

In this article we try to analyze the Mecelle provisions regarding tort law liability. The determination of who is liable to compensate for the damage arising from a tortious act (itlaf), under what conditions, and to what extent, is built upon a magnificent architecture of causation in Articles 90, 91, 92, and 93 of the Mecelle. This architecture is shaped not only by the legal outcome of the act but also by its “physical mode of realization” and the “will of the actor.”

1. Basic Rules in the Majalla’s Systematic Approach

The Mecelle divides tortfeasors into two categories based on their physical attributes and the manner in which they execute the act, drawing very strict lines for their degrees of liability:

  • Article 92 (Strict Liability of the Direct Actor / Mübâşir): “The direct actor is liable to make compensation, even if he did not act intentionally.” The person who physically executes the act and directly causes the damage through his own action (mübâşir) pays for the damage, even if it was a mere accident. No fault is required here; per the principle of personal liability, the one who physically commits the act pays the bill.
  • Article 93 (Fault Requirement for the Indirect Actor / Mütesebbib): “The indirect actor is not liable unless he acted intentionally.” The person who causes the damage indirectly, rather than by a direct physical act, is only liable if he acted with intent (müteammid).
  • Ali Haydar Efendi’s Analysis: In his commentary Dürerü’l-Hükkâm, the concept of “intent” (taammüd) here is defined not merely as desiring the outcome, but as engaging in transgression (ta’addî – active fault/exceeding limits) or negligence (taksir – passive fault/omission) while committing the act. A person who digs an unauthorized well on a public road, even without intending to kill a horse, is legally deemed intentional (müteammid) for committing a transgression (ta’addî) and becomes liable (zâmin).

Severance of the Causal Link and the “Es-sebebü Ke’l-Fâil” Exception

  • Article 90 (Concurrence of Causes): “Where the direct actor and the indirect actor concur, the legal ruling is attributed to the direct actor.” In an incident involving both an indirect cause and a direct perpetrator, the rule is that all liability falls on the direct actor (mübâşir). An intervening free and independent will severs the causal link of the indirect actor.
  • Exception (Vitiation of Will): If the fault of the indirect actor is so severe that it vitiates the free will of the direct actor, turning them into a mere “instrument/tool,” the rule is reversed. As in Ali Haydar Efendi’s example of the “rider falling into a well in the dark”; since the darkness nullifies the direct actor’s (the rider’s) ability to foresee and avoid the hazard, the law applies the rule “Es-sebebü ke’l-fâil” (The indirect cause is treated as the direct perpetrator). The rider is exonerated, the causal link is not severed, and the liability is directly imposed on the grossly negligent indirect actor (the one who dug the well).

Legal Justification

  • Article 91: “Legal permission negates liability.” An act permitted by law (lawful justification) does not give rise to compensation. As long as an indirect actor (e.g., someone digging a well on their own private land) acts lawfully (cevaz-ı şer’î), they are completely absolved from liability (zamân) even if damage occurs.

2. Comparative Modern Law Perspective

Modern legal systems have abandoned the Majalla’s physical distinction of “direct vs. indirect actor,” but achieve the same balance of justice through different umbrella concepts.

A. Swiss Law (OR) and Turkish Code of Obligations (TBK) – Civil Law System

  • Adequate Causation and Fault: It does not matter whether the perpetrator caused the damage directly or indirectly. The law examines whether the act is objectively capable of producing the damage in the ordinary course of life (adequate causation) and looks at the “fault” of the perpetrator.
  • Apportionment of Liability (Joint and Several Liability): While the Majalla mandates either apportioning the damage in shares among perpetrators or assigning the entire bill to a single person (the Direct Actor) based on the principle of personal liability (Article 90), Swiss and Turkish Law (TBK Art. 61) hold all at-fault parties jointly and severally liable (müteselsil sorumluluk) to protect the victim.
  • Fault in Bailment (Ta’addî): In Swiss Law, a person who exceeds the limits of a loan for use (Gebrauchsleihe) falls into the position of a “Usurper” (Gâsıp) under the Majalla, becoming strictly liable (Kausalhaftung) even for unexpected events/force majeure.

B. English Law (Common Law System)

  • Novus Actus Interveniens: This is the exact equivalent of Majalla Article 90. When an independent and new actor intervenes in the chain of events, the “intervening new act” breaks the chain of causation of the initial tortfeasor.
  • Innocent Agent: This perfectly mirrors the Mecelle’s “Es-sebebü ke’l-fâil” logic. If the intervening direct actor is an innocent agent who has been deceived, threatened, or lacks knowledge, the chain of causation is not broken, and the original indirect actor (mütesebbib) is held liable.
  • Deviation and Bailment: In English law, exceeding the authorized use in a bailment contract (Deviation) instantly places the bailee in the status of an Insurer, triggering Strict Liability.

3. Reflections in International Trade and Islamic Law (Mecelle) Solutions

The Mecelle’s system of causation and fault provides flawless, predictable, and equitable resolution mechanisms when applied to modern international trade law (Lex Mercatoria) disputes.

Case 1: Deviation in Logistics and Maritime Transport

  • Scenario: A commercial cargo (under bailment/trust status) sent from Türkiye to the UK is lost at sea when the ship’s captain unauthorizedly deviates from the contractual route for personal business and encounters an unforeseeable storm. The carrier argues, “I have no fault in the storm; it is a force majeure.”
  • Solution According to the Mecelle: In this incident, the direct actor (mübâşir) that physically destroys the cargo is nature itself (the storm). However, by deliberately changing the route (ta’addî), the carrier (mütesebbib) exceeded the limits of preservation (hıfz), losing the status of a bailee and falling into the position of a tortfeasor/usurper. Since the carrier acted with intent/gross fault (Article 93), nature intervening as the direct actor does not sever the causal link. Under the principle of “Es-sebebü ke’l-fâil”, the carrier is obliged to compensate the full market value of the cargo.

Case 2: Concurrence of Direct and Indirect Actors in the Supply Chain

  • Scenario: A German manufacturer produces a defective sensor for industrial machinery (Indirect Actor). An assembly plant in Türkiye integrates this sensor into the main machine, neglecting quality control procedures (Direct Actor). The machine explodes at the end-user’s facility, causing damage.
  • Solution According to the Mecelle: Article 90 comes into play. The defective production is an indirect cause (tesebbüb), but the assembly plant in Türkiye, which integrates the part and has the final testing obligation, is the “Direct Actor” (mübâşir) that physically executes the act. The free will and quality control negligence (taksir) of the assembly plant act as a new intervening act, severing the causal link from the German manufacturer. The end-user collects the entire compensation from the Turkish company (mübâşir). The Turkish company may later file a recourse claim against the German company based on their purchasing contract, but tort liability rests with the direct actor.
  • Modern Law and the Deep Pocket Theory Difference: In modern Western law, to protect the victim, the “Deep Pocket Theory” comes into play. The German manufacturer and the Turkish assembly firm can be held jointly and severally liable to allow the victim to reach the institutions with the highest payment capacity. The Mecelle, however, dictates that “the ruling is attributed to the direct actor”, imposing the bill directly on the mübâşir within the framework of the principle of personal liability.

Case 3: Customs Delays and Legal Permission (Article 91)

  • Scenario: An international shipment is delayed for 2 weeks at the destination customs due to a legal inspection by state authorities. During this time, the refrigerated container malfunctions, and the food products spoil. The buyer sues the customs administration and the carrier for damages.
  • Solution According to the Mecelle: Article 91 states; “Legal permission negates liability” (Cevaz-ı şer’î zamânı münâfîdir). The customs administration delayed the goods not arbitrarily, but in accordance with public order and the law (legal permission). Here, there is neither a will for direct action (mübâşeret) nor an unlawful indirect cause (mütesebbib). Liability cannot be imposed on the customs administration; the damage/risk rests on the party holding the property rights of the goods or the insurer (takaful).

Case 4: Port Loading Crane Accident and Employer’s Liability

  • Scenario: Highly sensitive devices awaiting export are being loaded onto a ship by a crane operator at the port; the container slips from the crane’s hook, crashing to the ground and shattering. The operator claims, “I did not do it intentionally, the sling broke, I have no fault.”
  • Solution According to the Mecelle (Article 92 – Principle of Personal Liability): The crane operator is the direct actor (mübâşir) because he physically moved the load via the crane mechanism and his act led to its fall. Under Article 92, “The direct actor is liable to make compensation, even if he did not act intentionally.” Even if the damage is the result of an accident, the strict liability principle requires the worker himself to pay the bill. The Majalla does not hold the port authority (the employer) directly liable.
  • Solution According to Modern Law (TBK Art. 66 – Vicarious Liability): Protecting the victim is essential. The port authority is held “strictly liable” for the actions of its employee. The cargo owner collects the compensation from the giant port company. The port company then seeks recourse from the worker internally.

Case 5: Cyber Piracy, Defective API, and Leaving the Door Open (Article 90)

  • Scenario: A software firm (Indirect Actor) installs a defective payment API containing a security vulnerability for an e-commerce site (Indirect Actor). A cyber pirate on the internet (Direct Actor) exploits this vulnerability, manipulates the system, and steals funds from customers’ accounts.
  • Solution According to the Mecelle (Tort and Bailment Exception):
    • Roles: The Cyber Pirate who personally and with free will manipulates the system to steal the money is the Direct Actor (Mübâşir). The Software Firm that wrote the vulnerable code and the E-Commerce Company that integrated this code into its system—digitally “leaving the door open”—are the Indirect Actors (Mütesebbib).
    • Application of Article 90: Under Majalla Article 90, the ruling is attributed to the direct actor. Even though the software/company left the door open, it is the pirate who stole the money with free will. The primary addressee of the tort is the pirate.
    • Bailment (Vedî’a) and Negligence Exception: The security of the customers’ funds is a trust (emanet) in the hands of the e-commerce site. By using a defective API, the e-commerce site committed negligence (taksir) in its duty of preservation (hıfz). The customer collects their money from the e-commerce site for breaching the contract.
    • Recourse: After compensating the damage, the e-commerce site seeks recourse against the Software Firm, which caused the damage “intentionally” (müteammid) under Article 93 by writing defective and deficient code.

Case 6: Power Outage in Cold Chain Logistics (Article 92 vs. Article 93)

  • Scenario: A medical drug container shipped from Türkiye is waiting at a customs warehouse; the warehouse attendant (Direct Actor) flips the breaker switch for cleaning purposes and forgets to turn it back on when finished. Concurrently, the technical service company (Indirect Actor), which failed to maintain the warehouse’s generators, has neglected its duty. The container warms up, and the drugs spoil.
  • Solution According to the Mecelle: In this incident, the warehouse attendant who commits gross negligence by forgetting to turn the switch back on is the Direct Actor (Mübâşir). The technical service that failed to maintain the generator is the Indirect Actor (Mütesebbib) for causing the system to fail. Under Majalla Article 90, although the technical service is at fault, the warehouse attendant’s act of “forgetting to turn on the switch” (as a new act/negligence) severs the causal link. The ruling is attributed to the direct actor, and the liability to compensate falls squarely on the warehouse party that forgot the switch.