A sales manager signed the contract, but the company says they had no authority. A shop manager issued a promissory note, but the business owner says they never authorised it. When is the other side protected, and who is liable to whom? This article starts from the Majalla’s idea of the unauthorised (fuzuli) transaction, then covers the difference between a commercial representative and a commercial agent under the Turkish Code of Obligations, ratification and damages for unauthorised representation, the English law of apparent authority, and two examples from international practice.
The Majalla: unauthorised dealings and ratification
The Majalla calls a sale of another person’s property or right made without permission bay’-i fuzuli, and makes it depend on the owner’s ratification (ijaza). According to secondary accounts of Article 368, if the owner, their agent or their guardian ratifies, the sale becomes effective; if not, it lapses. Ratification requires that the contracting parties and the subject matter still exist.
The book of agency (Art. 1449 onwards) ties authority to the will of the person who gives the task. Modern Turkish law follows the same basic logic: an act done without authority does not bind the principal unless the principal ratifies it. What modern commerce adds is separate protection for the third party’s reliance.
Turkish law: commercial representatives, commercial agents and unauthorised representation
- Commercial representative (ticari temsilci, TCO Art. 547 ff.): a person whom the business owner has expressly or impliedly authorised to run the business and to represent the owner, under the firm’s name, in matters concerning the business. Towards good-faith third parties, they are deemed authorised to carry out every transaction within the purpose of the business and to give bills-of-exchange undertakings.
- Commercial agent (ticari vekil, TCO Art. 551 ff.): a person authorised to manage the business or carry out some of its affairs without being given commercial representation power. Unless expressly authorised, they cannot borrow money, give bills-of-exchange undertakings, or bring or continue lawsuits. Their authority is limited to the ordinary affairs of the business.
- Ratification (TCO Art. 46): a transaction made by an unauthorised representative binds the principal if the principal ratifies it. The other party may ask the principal to say within a reasonable time whether it ratifies (Art. 46/2).
- Non-ratification and damages (TCO Art. 47): if the principal does not ratify, the loss caused by the invalidity of the transaction may be claimed from the unauthorised representative, provided the third party was in good faith. Scholars base this liability on culpa in contrahendo; where there is fault and equity requires it, the third party may also claim positive loss (Art. 47/2).
- Owner’s liability: the business owner answers to good-faith third parties for the acts of commercial representatives, commercial agents and other trade auxiliaries (TCO Arts. 547–554).
Three questions dominate in practice: whether the person is a commercial representative or a commercial agent (the scope of authority differs), how the authority is recorded in the contract, authority document or register, and whether the third party can be treated as in good faith. Whether the other side knew of any limit on authority is often decisive. Where excess of authority is alleged after the contract is signed, conduct amounting to ratification has to be established from the correspondence. For authority and compensation in agency relationships, see our article on the agent’s indemnity.
The English law view: actual and apparent authority
Under English law, an agent’s act binds the principal either through actual authority or through apparent (ostensible) authority. Actual authority may be express or implied. Apparent authority rests on a representation by the principal to the third party that the agent is authorised, and on the third party’s reliance on it.
- Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480: the Court of Appeal explained that actual and apparent authority generally coexist and coincide but either may exist without the other, and their scope may differ. Apparent authority rests on the principal’s representation and on estoppel.
- Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549: the chairman acted as de facto managing director without formal appointment. The case is often cited for implied actual authority inferred from the parties’ conduct and the circumstances; where the third party knows of a limit on authority, no contrary implication can arise.
- Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717: the House of Lords held that an agent cannot create apparent authority merely by claiming it; the representation must come from the principal.
Comparison: both systems bind the principal to an unauthorised act only through ratification, but both protect a third party’s reliance in defined circumstances. Turkish law fixes the scope of authority by statute for commercial representatives and commercial agents; English law infers it from the principal’s conduct and the nature of the business. In both, protection requires that reliance rest on the principal’s conduct and that the third party act in good faith.
Examples from international practice
- UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 2.2.5: an act of an agent without authority does not affect the principal’s legal relations with the third party, but the principal cannot invoke lack of authority against a third party it has caused reasonably to believe the agent was authorised. The official comments explain the rule as an application of good faith and the prohibition of inconsistent behaviour, and note its particular importance where the principal is an organisation.
- Southern Pacific Properties v Egypt (ICC 1983 and ICSID ARB/84/3): the question was whether the tourism minister signed the agreement as chairman of a state entity’s general assembly or in the exercise of administrative supervisory powers. The 1983 ICC award was set aside by the Paris Court of Appeal in 1984 on the ground that there was no arbitration agreement binding Egypt; the dispute was later heard at ICSID (award on the merits, 20 May 1992).
- State contract signed by an official without authority: as reported by IAReporter, an ICC tribunal declined jurisdiction because the official who signed a state contract lacked authority.
These examples show that authority to sign can decide not only whether the main contract binds a party but also whether an arbitration clause does. Keeping authority documents, signatory lists and approval correspondence on file when the contract is made is therefore important.
Frequently asked questions
A sales representative exceeded their authority and signed; is the company bound? If the company ratifies, yes. If it does not, a good-faith counterparty may claim its loss from the unauthorised representative (TCO Art. 47). Good faith and knowledge of the limits are assessed on the facts.
Can a commercial agent sign a promissory note? Not unless expressly authorised to give bills-of-exchange undertakings (TCO Art. 551 ff.).
Is there a time limit for ratification? The counterparty may set a reasonable period for the principal to say whether it ratifies (TCO Art. 46/2). The effect of silence depends on the facts.
Does English law apply to a Turkish contract? No. The governing law is fixed separately; this section is for comparison.
For general information only; not legal advice. The effect of authority and representation depends on the contract and the facts. Sources: Majalla Art. 368 and the book of agency (as reported in secondary sources); Turkish Code of Obligations Arts. 46, 47, 547–554; Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480; Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549; Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA (The Ocean Frost) [1986] AC 717; UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 2.2.5; Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (ICSID Rev.-FILJ 1993, 328; ILM 1993, 933); IAReporter report (ICC, unauthorised signatory).